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Figure 1: Landmine Impact Survey costs available from re-
ports found on http://www.sac-na.org.
spending more time and effort 
on the initial data collection 
could be useful. If the number 
of false positives can be reduced, 
it is reasonable to assume that 
overall costs will also decrease. 
The Expert Opinion Collection 
is usually a relatively small part 
of the overall survey cost, so in-
vesting more resources on ac-
curately collecting data early in 
the process may be a useful ap-
proach to improving the LIS 
cost-benefit ratio.
Conclusion
The initial data collection in an 
LIS designates communities as po-
tentially impacted by mines and 
UXO. Distinguishing between sus-
pected positives and false positives 
early in the process can reduce the 
costs of the LIS. Based on analysis 
of the correlation between costs and 
suspected positives, evidence sup-
ports that efficient planning can re-
duce future survey expenses.
Given the small number of coun-
tries that still require an LIS, the 
outcome of this analysis can give 
better cost estimates to potential do-
nors and identify the survey parts 
where savings are most probable 
in the future. At this stage, with so 
many Landmine Impact Surveys 
completed worldwide, rewriting the 
protocols is likely not useful. Fo-
cusing on more efficient implemen-
tation and collecting core data in 
different countries is a better route 
to cost savings overall. 
see endnotes page 83
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The Rise in Terrorist Attacks  
   in the Western Sahara
by Lt. Colonel Mohamed Taghioullah Ould Nema [ Cabinet of the Mauritanian National Army ]
The Mauritanian government is taking steps to prevent Al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts, including suicide 
bombings and kidnappings in the region. Added to this threat are the explosives Al-Qaeda is able to ob-
tain from landmines and unexploded ordnance scattered throughout the region after years of conflict in 
Western Sahara. The United Nations Development Programme and various countries work to remove 
these landmines and items of UXO, which is complicated by the lack of a Landmine Impact Survey.
In 2009, while driving toward the French embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, I suddenly encoun-
tered a large blast. As I approached 
the scene, I saw the worst sight I have 
ever seen—the results of a suicide 
bombing explosion. A 20-year-old 
man had blown himself up trying to 
kill two innocent embassy staff mem-
bers while they were exercising. The 
explosion split the man’s corpse into 
three parts: His head to stomach was 
dismembered and lying in the center 
of the path; his lower part was thrown 
about 12 meters (13 yards) away; and 
pieces of his legs and other small bits 
were strewn about on the pavement. 
He committed this action during the 
daytime, in front of everyone, and I 
saw it myself.
Immediately following the attack, 
fear paralyzed the people nearby. No 
one wanted to move because they 
were shocked and revolted by the ex-
plosion, and they were worried about 
additional attacks.
Al-Qaeda’s Terrorism in Mauritania
This was the first suicide bomb-
ing in the country and the beginning 
of many Al-Qaeda el Maghreb Islámi 
(Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb) 
attacks in Mauritania. For example, 
the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott 
was blown up by a grenade and as-
saulted by terrorist fighters, wound-
ing three people. Three French 
tourists were killed at Aleg (in the 
deep country). Finally, AQIM killed 
French captive Michel Germaneau 
in retaliation for a French raid that 
killed six AQIM militants.1 AQIM 
had kidnapped Michel Germaneau 
in Niger on the border with Mali and 
Algeria, but where he was killed re-
mains unknown.1,2
The Mauritanian government is 
determined to fight terrorists. Many 
specialized units in counterterror-
ism are stationed on the borders be-
tween Algeria, Mauritania and Mali. 
The soldiers comprising these units 
were highly trained in counterter-
rorism techniques by American 
and French experts. In addition, the 
Mauritanian government essentially 
provided all the needed equipment 
to the units (e.g., helicopters, vehi-
cles, radar, an armored personnel 
carrier, night-vision goggles, etc.).
Using technology and satellite 
data, Mauritania’s counterterror-
ism team is gathering accurate in-
telligence extending beyond the 
country’s borders to stop the extrem-
ists before they can launch new at-
tacks. A joint tactical-operational 
center was created in Algeria. This 
center provides updated intelligence 
information, assesses the security 
situation and coordinates shared ac-
tions against AQIM.
Other bandits, arms traffick-
ers and drug dealers are located in 
the same region as the AQIM fight-
ers and can collaborate with them 
in terms of resupply or equipment 
support, although AQIM mem-
A sentry guards the approach 
road to a lightly guarded Maurita-
nian Army munitions supply point.
All photos courtesy of John Stevens, 
PM/WRA, U.S. Department of State.
1
Nema: The Rise in Terrorist Attacks in the Western Sahara
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2011
66         notes from the field | the journal of ERW and mine action | spring 2011 | 15.1 15.1 | spring 2011 | the journal of ERW and mine action | research and development         67
bers govern all the military actions. 
Many AQIM fighters are former 
soldiers of Groupe Salafiste pour la 
Prédication et le Combat (Algerian 
Islamic insurgents). AQIM is build-
ing its capacities in many ways: It 
recruits young people and trains 
them through Islamist condition-
ing; it kidnaps hostages for ransom; 
and it obtains weapons and ammu-
nition from abandoned minefields 
and fragile military camps.
Various arms and explosive rem-
nants of war that can be utilizes illic-
itly are readily available to terrorists 
in the Western Sahara region. This 
area was a battlefield, and it has not 
been cleared of the UXO. This means 
AQIM and others can take advan-
tage of this situation to resupply 
their arms coffers. Moreover, many 
government weapons stockpiles and 
military bases are not built accord-
ing to modern standards. Some of 
these ammunition and light-weap-
on warehouses, therefore, are not 
secure, and AQIM fighters could 
conceivably penetrate them without 
too much difficulty and obtain weap-
ons from them.
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mining office has cleared many 
minefields since signing the Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Trans-
fer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction. More than 
150,000 mines of various types 
were removed, but the danger con-
tinues because many battlefields 
from the Western Sahara have not 
been cleared. Data is lacking about 
the exact mine and UXO locations 
since no comprehensive Landmine 
Impact Survey has been complet-
ed in the region.3 Western Sahara 
is contaminated following years of 
Frente Popular de Liberación de Sa-
guía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Saguia 
el-Hamra and Río de Oro, or Fr-
ente POLISARIO) and the Moroc-
co conflict. The UXO and mines 
are especially prevalent along the 
walls called “berms” created by Mo-
rocco to protect against the Frente 
POLISARIO. In addition, terrorists 
can easily reactivate some minefields 
(marked areas that are not entire-
ly cleared but have a small safe path 
within them) by adding one or two 
landmine strips to change the pat-
tern. While military-camp securi-
ty is very tight in the main towns, 
the situation is far less secure in the 
deep country, which makes it easy 
for terrorists to obtain weapons.
The main mine-action actors are 
the Mauritanian Army Engineering 
Corps and a few Mauritanian non-
governmental organizations. The 
United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, Canada, the United States 
and France have supported mine-
clearance and mine-risk educa-
tion programs. However, the lack 
Mauritanian Army officers and an of-
ficial from the NATO Maintenance and 
Supply Agency, during an assessment 
visit to one of Mauritania's remote and 
lightly guarded munitions supply points. 
of accurate assessment and Tech-
nical Survey, coupled with a lack 
of good management, have under-
mined Mauritania’s success in mak-
ing its lands safe. As a result, mines 
can still be found in many locations 
along Mauritania's northern fron-
tier and these weapons are used by 
bombers, terrorists or arms traffick-
ers, who can  then sell these devices 
to extremists.
The international community 
must act quickly to help the greater 
Western Sahara region solve this is-
sue. Preventing terrorists from ob-
taining weapons and ammunition is 
important. Strengthening and bet-
ter securing warehouses, military 
premises and camps where arms 
and munitions are obtainable is 
one solution; however, the govern-
ment must also organize an aware-
ness campaign about the danger of 
these issues and train  its personnel 
to properly store and secure weapons 
and ammunition. 
see endnotes page 83
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